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Abstract 
Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) have been used since the early years of public health. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides a standard definition for NPI 
and what NPI strategies are contained within the definition. This paper seeks to discover if state 
pandemic influenza plans use the term NPI and its strategies, and if states’ use of NPI strategies 
in their state pandemic plans is consistent with the CDC definition. To determine how states 
were defining and using the term NPI and NPI strategies a survey of forty-eight (48) state plans 
was conducted using each respective states’ pandemic plan. The survey revealed that the 
majority of states do not conform to the CDC definition, and in fact five (5) states do not use the 
term NPI at all. Furthermore only four (4) of the states surveyed use the NPI definition and NPI 
strategies as defined by the CDC. I recommend that those states that do use the term NPI and the 
NPI strategies be a blue-print for other state plans. 
STATE PREPAREDNESS  5 
State Preparedness: A Study of State Plans 
Purpose Statement 
Research question: Do state plans adhere to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) definition of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI)?  Non-pharmaceutical 
interventions as defined by the CDC are “…interventions outside of healthcare settings focus on 
measures to 1) limit international spread of the virus (e.g., travel screening and restrictions); 2) 
reduce spread within national and local populations (e.g., isolation and treatment of ill persons; 
monitoring and possible quarantine of exposed persons; and social distancing measures, such as 
cancellation of mass gatherings and closure of schools); 3) reduce an individual person's risk for 
infection (e.g., hand hygiene); and 4) communicate risk to the public” (CDC,  2008).  State plans 
were analyzed to answer the question of conformity between the CDC definition and what terms 
and strategies state plans were utilizing.  Each plan was surveyed for the use of various terms 
related to non-pharmaceutical intervention, NPI, and for any reference to any of the four 
strategies of the CDC definition (i.e., hand hygiene, isolation, and travel restrictions).  Each state 
plan was also surveyed for zoonotic disease reference beyond avian influenza both generally and 
with specific regard to NPIs.  This survey shows which states consider NPI important, and which 
rely primarily on vaccines.  
Background 
 The basis for the research of this paper began with a general interest of all-hazards 
preparedness within states.  That interest quickly became more focused on H1N1 and the mass 
prophylaxis approach to disease.  
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in 2003 began an initiative with 
the help of various other organizations (Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug 
Administration, and the CDC) to help prepare the U.S. by requiring each state to have a 
pandemic influenza plan (CDC, 2003).  As part of a Presidential Homeland Security Directive 
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(PHSD) each plan was to be developed in such a way that it could respond to an Avian Flu event, 
though having an Avian Flu plan was not required (CDC, 2003).  Meaning, that each state may 
have either all hazards plan, a pandemic influenza plan, or a avian specific plan or all three 
resulting in inconsistency across the spectrum of state plans.  As part presidential directive, each 
state was required to develop a state specific pandemic plan that would meet the unique needs of 
their state and provide “estimates of the potential impact of a pandemic in their state or locality” 
(CDC, 2003).  
Although the United States relies primarily on vaccine response to influenza, in the event 
of a novel or emerging infectious disease, a vaccine may not be available.  This response can be 
potential very dangerous as in 1976.  While there were no other pandemics during the 20
th
 
century, the 1976 influenza outbreak, or as it has been called, the 1976 influenza “fiasco”, 
warrants mention due to the drastic response by the Ford administration and the a potential 
hazard of vaccine-exclusive approach (Kilbourne, 2006).  A $90 million mass vaccination 
campaign was launched after six soldiers became ill due to H1N1 at Fort Dix, New Jersey.  The 
vaccination campaign itself cost 25 lives, due to a rare reaction to the vaccine.  The flu however, 
never became a pandemic.  Only one person is said to have died from the actual flu during the 
outbreak (Kilbourne, 2006).  
 Mass prophylaxis is effective only in cases where the vaccine is available, as both the 
1976 case and the recent H1N1 pandemic revealed (Kilbourne, 2006).  Non-pharmaceutical 
intervention contains strategies for limiting the spread of infection prior to or in the absence of a 
vaccine.   
 From the survey of states and their pandemic plans the findings showed that states did not 
consistently mirror the CDC definition of non-pharmaceutical interventions within state plans 
nor do the majority of states reference zoonotic disease at all in their state plans. 
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Literature Review 
NPI Strategies 
The strategies contained within the CDC definition of non-pharmaceutical interventions 
have been the topics of research, articles and debates.  The following is a brief overview of the 
research related to each of the strategies to provide a better basis of understanding for this paper 
and what it seeks to reveal.  Social distancing and absenteeism are common aspects of NPI. 
Quarantine is perhaps the most potentially controversial of the NPI methods, however, it is also 
one of the most effective in ultimately limiting the spread of infection.  Hygiene, generally 
includes both hand washing and cough etiquette and is one of the most basic of NPI methods in 
limiting the spread of infection.  The final NPI strategy that will be reviewed is public health 
communication, which is effectively distributing complete and effective instructions to the 
public.   
The primary aim of NPI strategies is to reduce transmission rates between ill and non-ill 
people by limiting contact between individuals that could result in infection.  For non-
pharmaceutical interventions to be successful in response to a disease pandemic requires a ready 
and informed public to be able to carry out instructions and participate in NPI strategies 
(Zottarelli, Sunil, & Rider, 2009).  These interventions are categorized into the two groups, 
individual and community level NPIs.  Primarily individual and community level NPI strategies 
only differ in that they are targeted at a person to limit further spread to the population and for 
that person’s individual welfare.  Community level NPIs are, as the term implies, are directed at 
groups or communities of people.  These interventions have three primary objectives: 1) delay 
disease transmission and outbreak peak: this limits the spread of the virus to reduce and 
eliminate the virus or to delay spread until a suitable vaccine is available; 2) to decrease burden 
on healthcare infrastructure (in an already strained system, an addition of adding just a small 
amount of patient load could quickly overwhelm the healthcare system and providers); and lastly 
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3) to reduce number of cases and as a result, reduce overall morbidity and mortality rates.  The 
reduction of the number of ill persons will result in a decreased the need for healthcare services 
and minimize the impact of a pandemic influenza outbreak on the economy and society (CDC, 
2009). 
Both individual and community level strategies include isolation, quarantine, and 
infection control.  Community level NPIs refers to the quarantine of groups or sites, social 
distancing measures (i.e. school and business closures, voluntary quarantine), and travel 
restrictions to a specific state, city or travel by or to a group of infected people (District of 
Columbia Department of Health, 2005).   
The implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions is guided by the CDC’s 
Pandemic Alert Period (Connecticut Department of Public Health, 2006; Pandemic Influenza 
Expert Group, 2002; Texas, 2008).  The Pandemic Alert Period is divided into six phases.  
Phases one and two are referred to as the inter-pandemic periods, meaning that there is a risk for 
human infection and that infection should be reported as quickly as possible.  Phases three 
through four represent the growing effort to detect, report, and contain or delay the spread of a 
new virus.  The final phase is to use all resources to minimize the impact of the pandemic 
(Chertoff, 2006).  Both mathematic and historical models of the 1918 pandemic reveal that the 
death rates within communities are directly related to time of implementation and the duration of 
NPIs strategies.  Initiating NPIs during the proper pandemic stage thus driving the mortality rates 
down for the duration of implementation, and resulting in a rise if they were discontinued 
(Markel et al., 2007; Texas, 2008).  Zottarelli, Sunil, and Rider (2009) states, “Mathematical 
modeling suggests that non-pharmaceutical intervention could flatten the overall epidemic peak 
if implemented early and sustained throughout the outbreak”. 
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Social Distancing and Absenteeism  
Blendon et al. (2008) found in a survey that 42 percent of respondents felt they would not 
be paid in the case of public health ordered isolation or school closures (Gostin, 2009; Blendon 
et al., 2008).  Maintaining an effective workforce is critical to maintaining healthcare and 
healthcare services as well as other critical infrastructure during any pandemic (Steinhardt, 
2009).  Absenteeism, particularly in the case of first responders, may result in greater potential 
for loss of life due to civil unrest, death from infection, or general lack of civil services (Chertoff, 
2006).  According a survey by Chertoff (2006), the “best case” scenario for workforce 
absenteeism is 30 to 40 percent during a severe disease pandemic throughout all professions. 
This appears to be in spite of the belief that they will not be paid for time not worked (Chertoff, 
2006). 
Social distancing (absenteeism, travel restrictions, snow days) is likely to become an 
issue during any pandemic (influenza or emerging infectious disease).  Both social distancing 
and isolation, whether voluntary or directed, may require protection from reciprocity for 
following public health direction to stay home if an individual is ill.  Maintaining and protecting 
employees and workers is critical during any pandemic (Steinhardt, 2009).  Absenteeism in these 
cases may not only be caused by actual illness of the individual, but could also be a result of 
needing to care for a loved one.  Social separation (caused by absenteeism), particularly for long 
durations can cause loneliness and emotional detachment, disrupt social and economic life 
(education, trade, business), and potentially infringe on liberties (Gostin, 2009).  
In addition, members of the workforce with children are likely to have increased rates of 
absenteeism due to the need to provide care for sick children and actual school closures, 
employers would need to plan accordingly for such situations (Blendon et al., 2008).  Chertoff 
(2006) states that “…if disease containment strategies fail, businesses and individuals will find 
themselves thrust into the frontlines in this public health battle.”  In the case of school closures, 
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whether the school is closed due to an influenza pandemic or where parents are forced to miss 
work in order to care for their children one can see how parents would immediately find 
themselves on the “frontline” due to an influenza pandemic where they are forced to miss work 
in order to care for their children (ill or not). 
The combination of the high numbers who may need to be absent from the workforce and 
given the high rate of individuals who feel they would not be paid, the government sector in 
particular should seek to protect the workforce from unfair economic consequences for 
compliance to individual or community level NPIs.  Businesses and government officials should 
seek to create an environment that allows the individual to comply without fear of reciprocity 
from employers (Upshur et al., 2005).  The majority of the public is unprepared economically or 
otherwise for a pandemic to reach its worst-case scenario (Redlener, 2006). 
According to a survey of the public response to non-pharmaceutical interventions by 
Blendon et al. (2008), a small number of sample respondents stated they would be unable to 
follow public health authorities’ direction in the case of workplace or school closure.  This small 
number of the sample could directly translate into millions who may have difficulty with such 
orders (Blendon et al., 2008).  This places a high level of responsibility on Public Health powers 
to carefully use authority in matters of quarantine and isolation, which should be delicately 
balanced in the health interests of society and the freedom of the people (Gostin, 2006).  
 While the effectiveness of closing schools and workplaces to limit the spread of 
pandemic disease has been debated, it also raises issues of what Gostin (2006) calls “distributive 
justice”.  Distributive justice as described by Gostin (2006) results in those of lower socio-
economic groups and minorities being potentially hurt more simply due to an already lower 
economic or underprivileged status.  Because of this, protection may be needed for such 
employees who desire to comply with social distancing or isolation orders against the will of 
their employer during a pandemic (Steinhardt, 2009; Gostin, 2006).  
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Absenteeism also puts at risk the critical infrastructure, which is comprised of any 
physical (power grids, water systems, hospital, fire, police, etc) or virtual system that is so vital 
to the U.S. that the incapacity or destruction of the system(s) would debilitate national security.  
Absenteeism within the emergency services agencies and hospitals due to actual sickness or the 
care of loved ones who are ill could have an acute impact of critical infrastructure throughout the 
states and the nation as a whole (Chertoff, 2006). 
Quarantine 
The term quarantine comes from the fourteenth and fifteenth century reference to the 40 
day period that certain ships that enter the port of Venice were required to remain to wait 
isolation before any person or good was permitted to go ashore (Alcade, Elster, & Rothstein, 
2003).  Today, the CDC only permits quarantine for three business days and the full duration of 
the quarantine cannot exceed the period of disease incubation and communicability.  Incubation 
refers to the time from exposure to the first signs and symptoms of the disease and 
communicability refers to the infectiousness of a disease transmissible by direct contact with an 
infected person or discharges from the infected person.  In addition, quarantine only refers to the 
mandatory isolation of the ill or suspected ill, not voluntary quarantines or isolation (Markel et 
al., 2007; Gostin, 2009).  This modern definition primarily restricts the activities of healthy 
persons who are suspected to have been exposed to the disease during the “period of 
communicability” (Hitchcock, 2007; Alcade et al., 2003).  
The primary purpose of quarantine, like that non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies in 
general, is to reduce the number of new cases and reduce the total death rate (Alcade et al., 
2003).  This concept of quarantine does not reflect this traditional definition conveyed by the 
term, but rather the “shelter in place” concept, which is defined as “ to make a shelter out of 
(any) place you happen to be” (CDC, 2008; Gostin, 2009).  Modern day cases of quarantine are, 
ideally, to be combined with the use of pharmaceutical intervention as well, if available.  
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However, in the case of novel pandemic influenza, or emerging infectious disease, 
pharmaceutical interventions will most likely not be available (Public Health and Law 
Enforcement Emergency Preparedness Workgroup, 2008).   
 The legal implications of quarantine are complex, as both the United Nations (UN) 
charter of human rights and the United States Supreme Court have asserted that travel and free 
association (freedom of movement) are fundamental rights of humanity (Gostin, 2009).  
According to Gostin (2006), “The basics characteristics of human rights see that they inherent in 
all people because they are human; they are universal, so that people everywhere in the world are 
“rights-holders.”  And they create robust duties on the state… Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 
 All humans have value by international law, but their freedoms can be suspended if there 
is a true threat to the public (Gostin, 2006).  The legal authority to order quarantine or isolation is 
held by the state and federal government, and therefore must be clear and guided by the law.  
Based on risk in such cases, decision makers must balance individual freedoms and common 
good of the people (Gostin, 2009; Gostin, 2006; Upshur et al., 2005).  The United States in 
particular has a culture of individuality that is framed by due process and skepticism towards 
government.  Therefore, according to 2003 study of SARS “securing large numbers of 
quarantine orders… would severely strain the resources of public health agencies, prosecutors, 
and the courts” (Alcade et al., 2003).   
Hygiene  
Another aspect of the definition of non-pharmaceutical interventions is to, “reduce an 
individual person's risk for infection (e.g., hand hygiene)” (CDC).  Hygiene, specifically hand 
washing and cough etiquette, are strategies that should be used constantly but emphasized greatly 
during pre-pandemic and pandemic phases. While the CDC non-pharmaceutical intervention 
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definition does not specifically mention cough etiquette, hand washing and cough etiquette 
campaigns are closely linked. 
The CDC states that there are five common instances where disease and germs can be 
transmitted by contaminated hands; hand to food, food to hand to food, food to hands to infants, 
infected infant to hand to other children, and nose mouth or eyes to hand to others (CDC, 2004).  
This study we are focuses on infection, using the CDC definition for hand hygiene as “hand 
washing with either plain soap or antimicrobial soap and water or use of alcohol-based products 
(gels, rinses, foams containing an emollient) that do not require the use of water (CDC, 2007; 
MMWR, 2002)”.  Cough etiquette is defined as “covering the mouth and nose while coughing or 
sneezing; using tissues and disposing in no-touch receptacles; and washing of hands often to 
avoid spreading an infection to others (CDC, 2007).” 
 During the H1N1 pandemic, hand washing and cough etiquette were greatly emphasized 
as a way to curb infection both in the United States and world-wide while a vaccine was being 
produced and distributed.  A survey of studies showed that influenza like illnesses could be 
reduced by as much as 65 percent over a six week period as a result of the effectiveness of hand 
hygiene, cough etiquette, and mask use (Elsevier, 2010).  The same survey revealed that in Hong 
Kong a substantial reduction in disease rates were realized if hand washing and protective mask 
were implemented within the first 36 hours of influenza like illness (Elsevier, 2010). 
Public Health Communication 
 Communicating risk to the public during a pandemic event is essential to limit the spread 
of disease and in directing public response.  During the H1N1 pandemic information was 
distributed in a variety of ways, most notably by the HHS Secretary herself in conferences to 
provide information about the severity and spread of the pandemic in the U.S. (CDC, 2009). 
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Zoonotic Diseases 
Zoonotic diseases are those that can be passed from animals, wild or domestic, to 
humans.  The majority of state plans focus on avian disease transmission primarily through 
poultry and wild birds, although this focus ignores the vastness of disease potential existing 
between animals to humans (CDC).  
The primary aspect of zoonotic disease reporting is biosurveillance, which is the process 
of detecting, monitoring, and characterizing national security health threats occurring between 
human and animal populations.  This includes food, water, agriculture, and the environment 
(Nuzzo, 2009).  Biosurveillance is necessary for timely and accurate reporting to decision 
makers for response and mitigation (Nuzzo, 2009; WMD, 2011). 
 The U.S has not developed a nation-wide disease surveillance system which was 
mandated by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002.  President Obama was presented a grade of “F” for the lack of readiness for a large scale 
contagious disease outbreak based on a recent study (WMD, 2011).  In fact, despite some limited 
advances in biosurveillance there is still no adequate integration of public sector and private 
sector data concerning zoonoses.  While this report was written in response to the nation’s ability 
to respond to a terrorist event, the implications are the same for an event that naturally occurs.  
“Americans are vulnerable to such an [terrorist] attack, as we are to a naturally occurring disease 
pandemic” (WMD, 2011).  This almost a decade after the act was passed in 2002 with almost no 
improvement to preparedness or biosurveillance.  
Methods 
To answer the question of do state plans adhere to the CDC definition NPI and NPI 
strategies, state plans were analyzed for similarities with the CDC definition.  To research 
adherence to the CDC definition, each plan was checked for the use of the following terms: non-
pharmaceutical intervention, nonpharmceutical intervention, intervention, NPI, hygiene, 
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isolation, quarantine, social distancing, and public health communication.  For each of the 
strategies contained in the definition, and for the use of the term itself, the plan was given a point 
for each, of which a maximum total of five (5) potential points.  Each point corresponded 
directly with the components of the definition (i.e., travel restrictions would be denoted by “1”), 
the fifth point for the use of the term NPI itself.   
Each state was also surveyed for preparedness for zoonotic and emerging infectious 
diseases.  Each plan was searched for any reference to zoonoses, the search terms were used; 
zoonotic, zoonoses, emerging, re-emerging, non-avian, epizoonotic and novel.  The states were 
then surveyed for reference zoonotic infections in the non-pharmaceutical interventions section 
of their plans.  The states were then categorized based on references to non-avian influenza or 
emerging infectious disease, and more specifically the inclusion of the term zoonoses in their 
NPI section. 
A total of forty eight (48) states were surveyed.  The two states not cited are Rhode Island 
and North Dakota.  When asked, Rhode Island stated through an e-mailed response that their 
state plan was confidential.  No response was given from North Dakota despite multiple attempts 
to contact them by both phone and e-mail.  This survey was conducted by utilizing the websites 
of each state’s health department or emergency management agency to acquire their state 
pandemic plan.  In the cases where the state plan was not easily accessible, the health department 
was contacted and the plan or a link to the plan was provided.  
The states were only evaluated based on referencing and using the NPI strategies within 
the NPI section of the plan.  For example, a plan might reference hand hygiene as a component 
of medical response or use of snow days as part of a pre-pandemic planning, but it would not 
receive a point because it was not applying the strategy in the “spirit” of the CDC definition.  
This was to ensure that all states were graded equally based upon only their use of the term NPI, 
its reciprocal terms, and NPI strategies.   
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Results and Data Analysis 
Table 1. State Score 
States broken down by score, alphabetically, if they reference CDC guideline, if the use 
NPI strategies, and which component(s) of the definition for which they received points 
State Points Received  
(0ut of five) 
Reference to 
CDC 
Use of NPI 
Strategies 
Point 
Distribution 
5 points Total 4     
Kentucky 5 Yes Yes 1,2,3,4,5  
Mississippi 5 No Yes 1,2,3,4,5 
Texas 5 Yes Yes 1,2,3,4,5   
North Carolina 5 Yes Yes 1,2,3,4,5 
4 Points Total 10     
Alaska 4 No Yes  1, 2, 3, 4 
Arizona 4 Yes Yes 1,2,3,4  
Arkansas 4 No Yes 1, 2, 3, 4 
California 4 No Yes  1, 2, 3, 4 
Florida 4 Yes  Yes 1,2,3, 5  
Kansas 4 Yes Yes 2,3,4,5 
Oklahoma 4 Yes Yes 1,2,3,5 
Maine 4 Yes Yes 1,2,3,4  
Nebraska 4 No Yes,  1,2,3,4   
New York 4 Yes Yes 2,3,4 
3 Points Total 11     
Alabama 3 No Yes 2,3,5   
Louisiana 3 No Yes  1,2,3  
Michigan 3 No Yes 2,3,4  
Minnesota 3 Yes Yes 1,2,3 
Missouri 3 Yes Yes 2,3,5  
New Hampshire 3 Yes Yes 2,3,5  
New Jersey 3 No No 2,3,5  
South Dakota 3 No Yes 1,2,4 
Utah 3 Yes Yes 2,3,4 
Vermont 3 No Yes 2,3,4  
Virginia 3 No Yes  1,2,5  
2 Points Total 12     
Colorado 2 No Yes  2,3 
Connecticut 2 No Yes 2, 3  
Hawaii 2 No Yes 2,3  
Idaho 2 No Yes 1,2 
Indiana 2 No Yes 2,3 
Massachusetts 2 No Yes 1,2 
Montana 2 No Yes 2,4 
New Mexico 2 Yes Yes 2,4  
Ohio 2 No Yes 2,4  
Oregon 2 No Yes 2,5  
West Virginia 2 No Yes 2,5 
Wyoming 2 No Yes  2,3 
1 Point Total 6     
Georgia 1 No No 3  
Illinois 1 No Yes 2 
Nevada 1 Yes Yes 2 
Pennsylvania 1 No Yes 5  
Tennessee 1 No Yes 2  
Wisconsin 1 No Yes 2 
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Table 1. State Score (Cont’d) 
States broken down by score, alphabetically, if they reference CDC guideline, if the use 
NPI strategies, and which component(s) of the definition for which they received points 
State Points Received  
(0ut of five) 
Reference to 
CDC 
Use of NPI 
Strategies 
Point 
Distribution 
0 Points Total 5     
Delaware 0 No Yes 0 
Iowa 0   0 
Maryland 0 No No 0 
South Carolina 0 Yes Yes 0 
Washington 0 No Yes 0 
Not Available     
North Dakota No Response   N/A 
Rhode Island Confidential   N/A 
State refers to what state is being surveyed. “Reference” refers to if the state does or does not reference the 
CDC guidance for NPIs. Usage of NPI strategies outlined in the CDC definition. Point distribution refers to 
which components of the definition were used in the plan 1) Limit the international spread of the disease 2) 
Reduce spread within national and local populations (e.g., isolation and treatment of ill persons etc.) 3) 
Reduce an individual person’s risk for infection (e.g., hand washing) 4) Communicate risk of disease 5) Use of 
the term Nonpharmaceutical Interventions within in pandemic plan. 
 
 
Table 2. 
NPI and alternative descriptors by state 
State Use of term NPI 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Florida 
Kentucky  
Kansas 
Missouri 
Mississippi 
New Hampshire 
New York 
North Carolina 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania  
Texas  
Virginia  
West Virginia 
Nonpharmaceutical 
Intervention, NPI 
Alaska Non-pharmacological 
Arkansas Infection Prevention and 
Control Practices 
California Non-pharmaceutical 
Community Containment 
Connecticut 
Iowa 
Maryland 
Washington 
New Jersey 
No Common Term Found 
Delaware Contagious Disease 
Containment Measures Plan 
Colorado 
Georgia 
Louisiana  
Infection Control 
State Use of term NPI 
Hawaii Non-medical Public Health 
interventions 
Idaho Community Disease Control 
Illinois Disease Control Measure 
Indiana Community Containment 
Maine 
Vermont 
Community-Based 
Containment Measures 
Massachusetts Control of Influenza Clusters 
Michigan Nonpharmaceutical measure 
Minnesota Community Disease 
Containment 
Montana Nonpharmaceutical Control 
Nebraska 
South Dakota 
Community Disease Control 
and Prevention 
Nevada Non-Pharmaceutical 
Community Containment 
Measures 
New Mexico Community Containment 
Strategies 
North Dakota N/A 
Ohio Strategies to limit 
Transmission 
Rhode Island N/A 
South Carolina Nonpharmaceutical 
Responses 
Tennessee Non-Pharmaceutical 
Community Mitigation 
Interventions 
Utah Community Mitigation 
Measures 
Wisconsin Nonpharmaceutical Measure 
Wyoming Community Mitigation 
Activities 
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 Four (4) states received all five points.  
 Seven (7) states reference the CDC guidance directly in relation to the use of NPI 
strategies (Arizona, 2006; Maine, 2005; Minnesota, 2006; Nevada, 2009; New 
Mexico, 2008; New York, 2008; South Carolina, 2008).   
 Ten (10) states received four points. All but three of those states used all the 
individual strategies of the definition, but not the term NPI itself (Alaska, 2008; 
Arizona, 2006; Arkansas, 2005; California, 2008; Florida, 2009; Kansas, 2009; 
Oklahoma, 2007; Maine, 2005; Nebraska, New York, 2008)  
 Eleven (11) states reference the CDC document on NPI for guidance on specific 
implementation. These states generally have very specific guidelines and 
parameters for NPI use (Florida, 2009; Kansas, 2009; Kentucky, 2007; Missouri, 
2009; New Hampshire, 2007; New York, 2008; North Carolina, 2008; Oklahoma, 
2007; Texas, 2008; Utah, 2007). 
 Seventeen (17) states use the term non-pharmaceutical intervention directly 
(Alabama, 2005; Arizona, 2006; Florida, 2009; Kansas, 2009; Kentucky, 2007; 
Missouri, 2009; New Hampshire, 2007; New Mexico, 2008; New York, 2008; 
North Carolina, 2008; Oklahoma, 2007; Oregon, 2006; Pennsylvania, 2005; Texas, 
2008; Utah, 2007; Virginia, 2009; West Virginia, 2006).   
 Thirty-one (31) states that do not use the term NPI (Table 2).  
 Five (5) state plans do not use any term for NPI at all, but rather only refer to the 
strategies (isolation and quarantine) (Connecticut, 2006; Massachusetts, 2006; 
Mississippi, 2010; Washington, 2006; Iowa, 2006).  
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 Three states (3) do not reference any NPI strategies at all within the plans 
(Maryland, 2002; New Jersey, 2006; Georgia, 2006).  
 Twenty-five (25) states use a different term to describe NPI strategies: “Community 
Mitigation Activities”, “Non-Pharmaceutical Community Containment Measures”, 
“Infection Control” and “Community Disease Control and Prevention” were the 
two most common terms among the states (Wyoming, 2009; Nevada, 2009) (Table 
2).  
 Twenty-three (23) states scored in the two and three point range. The most common 
point received was for “reducing the spread within national and local populations. 
The most common component missing among the plans was “communicating risk 
to the public”. While Delaware (2008) did receive four points, it did not use the 
components within the plans non-pharmaceutical interventions section. 
The states with no points may have used components of NPI strategies, but did not 
include them in an NPI or similar section (i.e., Delaware, 2008).  Other states did not have any 
NPI term or strategies outlined in their plans (Iowa, 2006). 
Table 3. Zoonoses 
States arranged alphabetically, values given were based on reference any other zoonoses 
than avian influenza (SARS, emerging infectious disease etc.). Those states highlighted in 
yellow did reference the importance of NPIs in relation to zoonoses. 
State Reference to Zoonotics 
other than Avian 
Reference to importance of NPI usage for 
Zoonotic 
Alabama None No 
Alaska None No 
Arkansas None No 
Arizona Yes No 
California Yes No 
Colorado None No 
Connecticut None No 
Delaware Yes No 
Florida Yes No 
Georgia None No 
Hawaii None No 
Idaho Yes No 
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Table 3. Zoonoses (Cont’d) 
States arranged alphabetically, values given were based on reference any other zoonoses 
than avian influenza (SARS, emerging infectious disease etc.). Those states highlighted in 
yellow did reference the importance of NPIs in relation to zoonoses. 
State Reference to Zoonotics 
other than Avian 
Reference to importance of NPI usage for 
Zoonotic 
Illinois Yes No 
Indiana Yes Yes 
Iowa None No 
Kansas None No 
Kentucky Yes No 
Louisiana Yes No 
Maine None No 
Maryland None No 
Massachusetts None No 
Michigan None No 
Minnesota None Yes 
Mississippi Yes Yes 
Missouri Yes Yes 
Montana Yes  Yes 
Nebraska Yes No 
Nevada Yes No 
New Hampshire None No 
New Jersey None No 
New Mexico Yes No 
New York Yes No 
North Carolina None Yes 
North Dakota N/A N/A 
Ohio None No 
Oklahoma None Yes 
Oregon None No 
Pennsylvania None No 
Rhode Island N/A N/A 
South Carolina None Yes 
South Dakota None Yes 
Tennessee None Yes 
Texas None No 
Utah None No 
Vermont None No 
Virginia None No 
Washington None No 
Wisconsin None No 
West Virginia None No 
Wyoming None No 
State refers to what state is being surveyed. “Reference” refers to if the state does or does not reference any 
other zoonotic event than avian influenza. States were evaluated on if they stress the importance of NPIs 
during an epizoonotic outbreak. 
 
 Ten (10) states reference the importance and necessity of NPI usage during the 
onset of a novel infectious disease (Indiana, 2005; Minnesota, 2006; Mississippi, 
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2010; Missouri, 2009; Montana, 2006; North Carolina, 2008; Oklahoma, 2007; 
South Carolina, 2008; South Dakota, 2006; Tennessee, 2009).   
 Twenty-nine (29) only mention novel influenza in the form of Avian Influenza 
(H5N1) (Alaska, 2008; Arkansas, 2005; Arizona, 2006; Connecticut, 2006; 
Georgia, 2006; Hawaii, 2008; Kansas, 2009; Maryland, 2002; Maine, 2005; 
Massachusetts, 2006; Michigan, 2009; New Hampshire, 2007; New Jersey, 2006; 
Ohio, 2006; Oregon, 2006; Pennsylvania, 2005; Texas, 2008; Utah, 2007; Vermont, 
2006; Virginia, 2007; West Virginia, 2006; Wyoming, 2009).  
 Two (2) states had no mention of any novel or emerging infectious disease, as well 
as two (2) states where the plan was unable to be accessed, Rhode Island and North 
Dakota (Alabama, 2005; Wisconsin 2007). 
Top state models:  Both Mississippi and North Carolina state plans reference the 
importance of NPIs during a zoonotic disease event.  Texas and Kentucky do not mention 
zoonoses within its NPI section of the state’s pandemic plan.  Realizing the importance of NPI 
strategies both during pandemic influenza, as well as during a novel or emerging infectious 
disease outbreak, prepares these states to better respond to an event in a vaccine based system.   
Conclusion 
This study of state plans reveals the basic lack of unity to the CDC definition of non-
pharmaceutical interventions and the strategies contained within it.  The majority of states do not 
use or reference the CDC definition for NPI.  Many of those states also fail to utilize all of the 
NPI strategies, which could be the only means of response in the absence of shortage of or 
vaccine, particularly in the case of novel or zoonotic diseases. 
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The lack of a common term across state pandemic plans could lead to a potential break-
down in the public health efforts, or could cause delay in a multi-state outbreak situation, due to 
lack of common definition.  State plans as they are now written, use multiple terms (Table 2) to 
describe NPI and NPI like descriptors.  The lack of use of the CDC non-pharmaceutical 
intervention definition and strategies, reveals a need for better communication between federal 
government and state planners. 
State plans do not consistently mirror the CDC definition of NPI, nor do the majority 
mention zoonoses, or include zoonoses, in the NPI sections.  State plans in their current form 
leave the public in great danger from, a pandemic event, which is likely to be zoonotic.  The U.S. 
vaccine based approach, will not be able to protect the public, emphasizing the need to make NPI 
strategies the primary means to limit the spread of infection and lower mortality rates.  
SARS (2003) is a prime example of a recent zoonotic event.  Emerging infectious 
diseases (or zoonotic disease), like SARS, that should warrant NPIs to be even more critical in 
the interim between sentinel cases and the availability of a vaccine (WMD, 2011; Nusso, 2009).  
 Because of a vaccine based approach to disease, NPIs may be very important in the 
response to a novel, non-avian flu event.  NPI strategies will help prevent the spread of disease 
during the initial onset when a vaccine will not be available.  Despite this fact, only a few states 
emphasize NPI strategies as a direct response to zoontotic disease acknowledging that a 
traditional vaccine approach may be completely ineffective in response to pandemic.  
Limitations 
Further study is needed to find if the implementation of the term NPI and the strategies 
within these state plans is actually effective in exercises and during true pandemic events.  
Further study of real world and exercise-based implementation within states would be helpful in 
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determining and measuring the benefit(s) of using a common definition and strategy for non-
pharmaceutical interventions throughout all state plans. 
 This paper seeks to analyze available written plans; it cannot completely predict or 
account for what NPI strategies may be in place that are substantive and viable alternatives to 
NPI, but were not captured by the survey due to establish parameters.  Nor can it account for 
additional plans that states may have written.  The presidential directive does mandate that states 
have a pandemic plan: it does not mandate that the plan should be focused on pandemic avian 
influenza, or all hazards; and that it should be applicable to avian influenza (CDC, 2003).  A 
state may in fact have a separate plan for each event, or a very basic all hazards plan they intend 
to utilize regardless of the threat or event.  
Recommendations 
 It is apparent that many states plan fail to prepare to respond to a novel or infectious 
disease event, where vaccine response will be limited or unavailable and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions most effective, if not the only effective response. 
 To better prepare states to adhere to the CDC definition of NPI and its individual 
components, many steps toward this goal should be mandated.  There is already a Presidential 
Homeland Security Directives requiring an Avian Flu response plan.  This should be expanded 
upon to ensure that all plans include a comprehensive NPI response component, at least within 
their influenza plan, if not within all state plans. 
 Avian Influenza, while a type of zoonoses, is not the only, or necessarily the most likely, 
emerging zoonotic infectious disease to be potentially pandemic.  Given the recent report of bio-
terrorism preparedness (receiving the grade of “F”), and the level at which states neglected to 
address any epizoonotic event with in their pandemic plans it would be prudent to ensure 
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inclusion of non-avian influenza and emerging infectious disease within state plans.  This would 
also bolster the addition of non-pharmaceutical interventions within all plans due to the 
ineffectiveness or lack of availability of any vaccine for novel diseases.  
 In order for states to most effectively utilize NPI responses more emphasis should be 
placed on biosurveillance at national and local levels.  As the WMD (2011) report states, much 
of the funding for biosurveillance has been cut or regularly reduced since 9/11.  If the U.S. 
chooses to maintain a vaccine based approach, biosurveillance will be critical to shortening the 
time between the initial cases and when the first doses of the vaccine would be available.  In the 
absence of meaningful biosurveillance systems, non-pharmaceutical interventions are the only 
weapon against a potential novel or emerging infectious disease. 
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Appendix A: Public Health Competencies Met 
Specific Competencies 
Domain #1: Analytic Assessment Skill 
Defines a problems 
Determines appropriate uses and limitations of both quantitative and qualitative data 
Selects and defines variables relevant to defined public health problems 
Identifies relevant and appropriate data and information sources 
Evaluates the integrity and comparability of data and identifies gaps in data sources 
Applies ethical principles to the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data and information 
Obtains and interprets information regarding risks and benefits to the community 
Applies data collection processes, information technology applications, and computer systems 
storage/retrieval strategies 
Domain #2: Policy Development/Program Planning Skills 
Collects, summarizes, and interprets information relevant to an issue 
States policy options and writes clear and concise policy statements 
Identifies, interprets, and implements public health laws, regulations, and policies related to specific 
programs 
Articulates the health, fiscal, administrative, legal, social, and political implications of each policy option 
Develops mechanisms to monitor and evaluate programs for their effectiveness and quality 
Domain #3: Communication Skills 
Communicates effectively both in writing and orally, or in other ways 
Solicits input from individuals and organizations 
Effectively presents accurate demographic, statistical, programmatic, and scientific information for 
professional and lay audiences 
Attitudes 
Listens to others in an unbiased manner, respects points of view of others, and promotes the expression of 
diverse opinions and perspectives 
Domain #4: Cultural Competency Skills – N/A 
Domain #5: Community Dimensions of Practice Skills – N/A 
Domain #6: Basic Public Health Sciences Skills 
Identifies the individual’s and organization’s responsibilities within the context of the Essential Public 
Health Services and core functions 
Identifies and applies basic research methods used in public health 
Identifies and retrieves current relevant scientific evidence 
Identifies the limitations of research and the importance of observations and interrelationships 
Attitudes 
Develops a lifelong commitment to rigorous critical thinking 
Domain #7: Financial Planning and Management Skills – N/A 
Domain #8: Leadership and Systems Thinking Skills 
Creates a culture of ethical standards within organizations and communities 
 
